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Abstract. With the enlargement of wireless technology, vehicular ad-
hoc networks (VANETs) are emerging as a promising approach to re-
alizing smart cities and addressing lots of serious traffic problems such
as road safety, convenience and efficiency. In order to avoid any pos-
sible rancorous attacks, employing lightweight ciphers is most effective
to implement encryption/decryption, message authentication and digi-
tal signature for security of VANETs. LED is a lightweight block cipher
with two basic keysize variants, including LED-64 and LED-128. Since
its designing, a multitude of fault analysis techniques focus on provoking
faults at the last four rounds of LED to derive the 64-bit and 128-bit
secret keys. It is vital to investigate whether injecting faults into a for-
mer round allows breaking LED. This study presents a novel impossible
meet-in-the-middle fault analysis on one round earlier of LED. A detailed
analysis of the expected number of faults is proved to uniquely determine
the secret key. It is based on the propagation of truncated differentials
and surprisingly reminiscent of the computation of the complexity of a
rectangle attack. It shows that the impossible meet-in-the-middle fault
analysis could successfully break LED by fault injections.
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1 Introduction
Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) are appearing as a new landscape of mo-
bile ad-hoc networks, with the aim of providing a wide spectrum of safety and
comfort applications for drivers and passengers. It has been tremendously suc-
cessful and naturally attracted considerable attention from both academia and
industry [1]. However, VANETs are networks with high dynamic topology and
their connections is vulnerable to attacks. For instance, attackers may exploit
VANETs to send bogus information to deceive other vehicles. Therefore, conser-
vation of security in VANETs is an indispensable demand. Nodes in VANETs
should be confident that each communication has been started from a trustwor-
thy source node and messages are not varied by malicious vehicles. Although
these issues seem similar to those used in traditional communication networks,
there are individual characteristic for VANETs. The seriousness of security fail-
ures, the selforganized nature of network, the high mobility of vehicles, the rel-
evance of vehicles to their geographic position, and the irregular connectivity
between vehicles can cause different security issues in VANETs [2-4]. On the
limitation of processing capability, power supply and memory space of highly-
constrained devices in vehicles, traditional ciphers cannot play direct roles in lots
of security applications, such as encryption/decryption, message authentication,
and digital signature, etc. It is very serious and urgent to implement effective ci-
phers in VANETs, i.e., lightweight ciphers are mostly selected for confidentiality,
authentication and integrity [5-13]. Thus, appliance of lightweight ciphers can
reduce energy consumption for devices, and allow more network communications
with lower-resource devices in vehicles.
The lightweight cipher LED can be optimized for the RFID tags and other
highly-constrained devices for security of the vehicles in VANETs [14]. Its secu-
rity has been demonstrated by the designers to be against linear attack, different
attack, algebraic attack, cube tester, integral attack, rotational attack and slide
attack. Then Mendel et al. improved a differential attack depending on the mega-
boxes and super-boxes [15]. Isobe et al. applied the low key-dependency into the
key schedule and presented a meet-in-the-middle attack on the internal rounds
of LED [16]. Later Nikolić et al. made use of the multicollision attack and slidex
attack on the round-reduced version of LED [17]. Soleimany presented the prob-
abilistic slide attack on LED-64 [18]. Except the traditional cryptanalysis, much
research focuses on LED against fault analysis in recent years [19-25].
In the last two decades, fault analysis puts forward a serious threat for cryp-
tographic implementation. It can deduce the secret key by applying the mathe-
matical relations of a cipher resulting from correct and faulty operations. Boneh
et al. presented RSA against fault analysis by provoking the faulty bits in 1996
[25, 26]. Later a multitude of fault analysis techniques, including differential fault
analysis (DFA), impossible differential fault analysis (IDFA), and meet-in-the-
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middle fault analysis (MFA) et al., were later proposed to break block ciphers
[27-29]. The attackers can inject faults into the running procedure by exploring
a glitch on the clock, a spike on the power supply, or implementing the external
ways of the laser and electromagnetic radiations. They makes advantage of the
leaked faulty calculations with mathematical methods. Usually, fault analysis is
much stronger than traditional cryptanalysis.
As for LED, recent research of fault analysis has been devoted to deriving
calculations about the secret key by examining the differential, algebraic, sta-
tistical or impossible differential relations to recover the subkeys, respectively.
Table 1 illustrates the comparison of the latest fault analysis results on LED.
Three research groups proposed DFA to break LED in the same year [19-21].
They can break the last subkey by injecting faults into the antepenultimate
round of LED. Jeong et al. can derive the 64-bit secret key by one random nib-
ble fault injection. Li et al. extended a random nibble-oriented fault model to
a random byte-oriented fault model, and break LED-64 and LED-128 with 3
and 6 faults, respectively. Jovanovic et al. applied some techniques of propor-
tional relationships between different layers to reduce the number of faults to 1
and 2, respectively. Then Zhao et al. proposed an algebraic fault analysis (AFA)
by inducing the same faults into the antepenultimate round [22]. They used an
algebraic relationship to describe the intermediate value of LED, respectively.
Depending on on the statistical relationship, Ghalaty et al. presented a differ-
ential fault intensity analysis (DFIA) by introducing 14 and 28 biased faults
into the last round of LED-64 and LED-128, respectively [23]. In 2016, Li et al.
presented an IDFA on LED and extended fault locations to the third last round
with 48 and 96 faults, respectively [24]. Hence, the previous fault analysis only
targets on the last four rounds of LED.
Table 1. Summary of fault analysis on LED.
Type First fault location ]Faults on LED-64 ]Faults on LED-128 Ref.
DFA r-2 1 − [19]
3 6 [20]
1 2 [21]
AFA r-2 1 2 [22]
DFIA r 14 28 [23]
IDFA r-3 48 96 [24]
IMFA r-4 44.2 88.4 This paper
Adding protection to full rounds of a lightweight cipher is ideal against fault
attack for the high-constrained devices in VANETs. However, it can decrease
the performance, and are usually expensive in many implementations. Hence,
practical countermeasures are suggested to protect only the first and last several
rounds of a cipher in these devices. In the real applications, random faults can
occur in any round or register of the lightweight cipher. It is excellent that the
high-constrained devices can be resistant against all kinds of malicious attackers
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and dangerous environments. In other words, any vulnerability of a lightweight
cipher against fault analysis should be detected as soon as possible, if fault
locations can be extended to more rounds. It is the motivation why we investigate
a novel fault analysis by attacking earlier rounds of LED.
In this study, a novel impossible meet-in-the-middle fault analysis (IMFA) is
successfully applied to break LED. Compared with the previous fault analysis,
faults can be injected into the fourth last round of LED, and the novel fault path
in IMFA affects more rounds. The attackers make advantage of the connection
between an impossible relation and a meet-in-the-middle relation to recover the
subkeys of LED. Up to now, the fault location is the deepest round of the LED
cipher. On the basis of the propagation of truncated differentials, we present
a detailed analysis to describe the attacking complexity in a rectangle view. It
can measure the connection of two different and independent relations, and thus
improve the theoretical accuracy in essence.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
specification of LED. Section 3 introduces the impossible differential fault anal-
ysis and meet-in-the-middle fault analysis, respectively. Then section 4 proposes
our impossible meet-in-the-middle fault analysis to break LED-64 and LED-
128. The next two sections presented the attacking complexity and analyze the
experimental results. The last section concludes the paper.
2 Specification of LED
The LED lightweight cipher fixes the block lengh to 64 bits, and supports key
lengths of 64 bits and 128 bits [14]. It has 32 and 48 rounds for LED-64 and LED-
128 as Fig. 1 shows. The state can be pictured as a rectangular array of nibbles,
consisting of four rows and four columns. Each basic step is a sequence of four
identical rounds with a subkey addition, denoted as AddRoundKey(ARK). Each
round is composed of AddConstants, SubCells, ShiftRows and MixColumnsSerial
in sequence:
– AddConstants(AC) adds constants to the state with a bitwise XOR opera-
tion.
– SubCells(SC) applies S-boxes to each nibble of the state independently.
– ShiftRows(SR) cyclically shifts each row of the state by different offsets.
– MixColumnsSerial(MC) takes all the columns and multiply their data with
a matrix.
The sequence of steps for the decryption is same as that for the encryption
using the same subkeys. The secret key K depends on a key schedule to generate
two subkeys k1 and k2 for LED as Table 2 shows.
3 The IDFA and MFA attack on LED
3.1 Notations
The notations of LED and its analysis are described as Table 3 shows:
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Fig. 1. Structure of LED.
Table 2. Versions of LED
Version Key size Block size Rounds Key schedule
LED-64 64 64 32 K = k1
LED-128 128 64 48 K = k1||k2
Table 3. Notations of LED
Notions Description
x the 64-bit plaintext
y, yˆ the 64-bit correct and faulty ciphertexts
k1, k2 the 64-bit subkeys from the secret key K
r the number of rounds with r ∈ {32, 48}
αl, βl, γl, δl the 64-bit output of the AC, SC, SR and MC layers in the l-th round
with 1 ≤ l ≤ r
αˆl, βˆl, γˆl, δˆl the 64-bit faulty output of the AC, SC, SR and MC layers in the l-th
round with 1 ≤ l ≤ r
βr, βˆr the values before addition with the correct subkey k1, and βr = y ⊕ k1,
βˆr = yˆ ⊕ k1
g the guess for k1
z, zˆ the values obtained by xoring the ciphertexts with the guess for the
subkey, and z = y ⊕ g, zˆ = yˆ ⊕ g
µ, µˆ the values derived from z in the same way as δr−1 is derived from βr
ω, ωˆ the values derived from µ in the same way as βr−1 is derived from δr−1
IAC, ISC, ISR, IMC the inverse operation of the AC, SC, SR, and MC layers
3.2 fault model and main procedure
The fault model includes chosen plaintext attacks and random nibble-oriented
fault model. The IDFA and MFA are two independent different kinds of fault
analysis, which are proposed to attack AES [29]. Some random faults are in-
jected into the third last round of the running procedure, and thus right and
faulty ciphertexts are obtained. Then main procedures exploit the impossible
relationship and meet-in-the-middle relation of the SubCells, respectively. As
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for the IDFA attack, the output differences in each nibble of the penultimate
SubCells are not null. That is,
(βr−1 ⊕ βˆr−1)4i 6= 0
(βr−1 ⊕ βˆr−1)4i+1 6= 0
(βr−1 ⊕ βˆr−1)4i+2 6= 0
(βr−1 ⊕ βˆr−1)4i+3 6= 0
,
where i represents the i-th column of the state, and 0 ≤ i ≤ 3. As for the MFA
attack, the input differences in each nibble of the penultimate SubCells have the
following relations: 
(αr−1 ⊕ αˆr−1)4i = ξ4i
(αr−1 ⊕ αˆr−1)4i+1 = ξ4i+1
(αr−1 ⊕ αˆr−1)4i+2 = ξ4i+2
(αr−1 ⊕ αˆr−1)4i+3 = ξ4i+3
,
where all vectors of {ξ4i, ξ4i+1, ξ4i+2, ξ4i+3} ⊆ ({0, 1}4/{0})4 are proportional,
and 0 ≤ i ≤ 3. Thus, the last subkey can be recovered. Then the attacker can
recover the last subkey and decrypt the right ciphertext to obtain the input
of the last round. They repeat the above procedure to induce faults to the
running procedure until the secret key is drived. In [24], the IDFA attack can
recover LED-64 and LED-128 with 48 and 96 faults, respectively. There is no
experimental results about the MFA attack on LED.
4 Impossible Meet-in-the-Middle Fault Analysis on LED
In the novel impossible meet-in-the-middle fault analysis, the attackers can store
a ciphertext when encrypting any plaintext with a secret key. Their aim is to
recover the subkey k1 in the last round. The first fault injection targets at the
(r–4)th round, where r ∈ {32, 48}. As Fig. 2 shows, a fault may be injected into
αr−4, βr−4 or γr−4; the approach is identical in either case. Any modification
provokes the XOR-differences of the last five rounds, and the correct ciphertext
y are converted into the faulty ciphertext yˆ. The attackers have
βr = ISR(IMC(y ⊕ k1))
= ISR(IMC(y))⊕ ISR(IMC(k1))
= y′ ⊕ k′1,
βˆr = ISR(IMC(yˆ ⊕ k1))
= ISR(IMC(yˆ))⊕ ISR(IMC(k1))
= yˆ′ ⊕ k′1,
where
y′ = ISR(IMC(y)),
yˆ′ = ISR(IMC(yˆ)),
k′1 = ISR(IMC(k1)).
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And
δr−2 ⊕ δˆr−2 =IAC(ISC(ISR(IMC(IAC(ISC(βr))))))⊕
IAC(ISC(ISR(IMC(IAC(ISC(βˆr))))))
=ISC(ISR(IMC(AC(ISC(y′ ⊕ k′1)))))⊕
ISC(ISR(IMC(AC(ISC(yˆ′ ⊕ k′1))))).
y
SCAC SR
SCARK
AC
SR MC
SCAC SR MC
ISCIAC ISR IMC
ISCIAC ISR IMC
ARK
MC
4rα − 4rβ − 4rγ − 4rδ −
3rα − 3rβ − 3rγ − 3rδ −
2rα − 2rβ − 2rγ − 2rδ −
1rα − 1rβ − 1rγ − 1rδ −
rα rβ rγ rδ
Fig. 2. One of the fault attacking paths in the last five rounds.
Since the output difference in each nibble of the antepenultimate SubCells
and ShiftRows layers are not null, the impossible differential relationship must
hold:
(γr−2 ⊕ γˆr−2)j = (IMC(δr−2 ⊕ δˆr−2))j 6= 0,
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where 0 ≤ j ≤ 15. Thus, there are four groups of meet-in-the-middle relation-
ships for every column of δr−2 ⊕ δˆr−2 as follows:
(δr−2 ⊕ δˆr−2)4i = ϕ4iη
(δr−2 ⊕ δˆr−2)4i+1 = ϕ(4i+13) mod 16η
(δr−2 ⊕ δˆr−2)4i+2 = ϕ(4i+10) mod 16η
(δr−2 ⊕ δˆr−2)4i+3 = ϕ(4i+7) mod 16η
,
where i represents the i-th column of the state, mod denotes the modular oper-
ation, ϕη represents all possible solutions of (γr−2 ⊕ γˆr−2)j 6= 0, 0 ≤ η ≤ 154–1,
0 ≤ i ≤ 3 and 0 ≤ j ≤ 15. Hence,
ISC(ISR(IMC|0(AC(ISC(y′4i ⊕ k′4i1 )))))
⊕ISC(ISR(IMC|0(AC(ISC(yˆ′4i ⊕ k′4i1 ))))) = ϕ4iη
ISC(ISR(IMC|1(AC(ISC(y′4i+1 ⊕ k′4i+11 )))))
⊕ISC(ISR(IMC|1(AC(ISC(yˆ′4i+1 ⊕ k′4i+11 ))))) = ϕ(4i+13) mod 16η
ISC(ISR(IMC|2(AC(ISC(y′4i+2 ⊕ k′4i+21 )))))
⊕ISC(ISR((IMC|2(AC(ISC(yˆ′4i+2 ⊕ k′4i+21 ))))) = ϕ(4i+10) mod 16η
ISC(ISR(IMC|3(AC(ISC(y′4i+3 ⊕ k′4i+31 )))))
⊕ISC(ISR(IMC|3(AC(ISC(yˆ′4i+3 ⊕ k′4i+31 ))))) = ϕ(4i+7) mod 16η
,
where 0 ≤ i ≤ 3. The above equations allow to restrict possible candidates for
k′1. The attackers can do brute-force search for k′1 column per column, until there
is only one left in the set of k′1 candidates by intersections. Thus, the equation
can be solved for K in LED-64:
K = k1 = MC(SR(k
′
1)).
As for LED-128, the attackers can decrypt the last four rounds using the
subkey k1 to obtain the input of the (r–3)th round, represented as αr−3. They
can take the above attacking procedure to derive all nibbles of K ′2 when random
faults are injected before δr−8 in the (r–8)th round. They have
βr−4 = ISR(IMC(αr−3 ⊕ k2))
= ISR(IMC(ar−3))⊕ ISR(IMC(k2))
= α′r−3 ⊕ k′2,
βˆr−4 = ISR(IMC(αˆr−3 ⊕ k2))
= ISR(IMC(αˆr−3))⊕ ISR(IMC(k2))
= αˆ′r−3 ⊕ k′2,
where
α′r−3 = ISR(IMC(αr−3)),
αˆ′r−3 = ISR(IMC(αˆr−3)),
k′2 = ISR(IMC(k2)).
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Hence,
δr−6 ⊕ δˆr−6 =IAC(ISC(ISR(IMC(IAC(ISC(βr−4))))))⊕
IAC(ISC(ISR(IMC(IAC(ISC(βˆr−4))))))
=ISC(ISR(IMC(AC(ISC(α′r−3 ⊕ k′2)))))⊕
ISC(ISR(IMC(AC(ISC(αˆ′r−3 ⊕ k′2)))).
And 
(δr−6 ⊕ δˆr−6)4i = ϕ4iη
(δr−6 ⊕ δˆr−6)4i+1 = ϕ(4i+13) mod 16η
(δr−6 ⊕ δˆr−6)4i+2 = ϕ(4i+10) mod 16η
(δr−6 ⊕ δˆr−6)4i+3 = ϕ(4i+7) mod 16η
,
where ϕη denotes all possible solutions of (γr−6 ⊕ γˆr−6)j 6= 0, 0 ≤ η ≤ 154–1,
0 ≤ i ≤ 3, and 0 ≤ j ≤ 15. Hence,
ISC(ISR(IMC|0(AC(ISC(α′4ir−3 ⊕ k′4i2 )))))
⊕ISC(ISR(IMC|0(AC(ISC(αˆ′4ir−3 ⊕ k′4i2 ))))) = ϕ4iη
ISC(ISR(IMC|1(AC(ISC(α′4i+1r−3 ⊕ k′4i+12 )))))
⊕ISC(ISR(IMC|1(AC(ISC(αˆ′4i+1r−3 ⊕ k′4i+12 ))))) = ϕ(4i+13) mod 16η
ISC(ISR(IMC|2(AC(ISC(α′4i+2r−3 ⊕ k′4i+22 )))))
⊕ISC(ISR((IMC|2(AC(ISC(αˆ′4i+2r−3 ⊕ k′4i+22 ))))) = ϕ(4i+10) mod 16η
ISC(ISR(IMC|3(AC(ISC(α′4i+3r−3 ⊕ k′4i+32 )))))
⊕ISC(ISR(IMC|3(AC(ISC(αˆ′4i+3r−3 ⊕ k′4i+32 ))))) = ϕ(4i+7) mod 16η
,
where 0 ≤ i ≤ 3. The secret key K is deduced as
K = k1||k2 = K1||MC(SR(k′2)).
5 Attacking Complexity
5.1 A rectangle view
The previously defined variables can be placed in a kind of rectangle (as in
the rectangle attack) where in one dimension we have the difference between
the correct texts and the faulty texts, and in the other dimension we have the
difference between the observed values (computed by the attacked device with
the correct key) and the predicted values (computed by the attackers with the
guess for the key). We now provide an analysis based on a single column. We
know that MixColumnsSerial maps an input difference with only one non-zero
nibble always to an output difference with four non-zero nibbles. There are
4 · 15 = 60 such nibbles. This is shown in the third row of Table 4. Similarly
for other types of inputs, we count the number of possible inputs in that case
and count the number of times they are mapped to an output with 1, 2, 3 or 4
nonzero nibbles, cf. Table 4.
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Table 4. The relation between the numbers of nonzero input and output nibbles in
MixColumnsSerial
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 60
2 0 0 0 360 990
3 0 0 360 3600 9540
4 0 60 990 9540 40035
5.2 Computing the probability
Lemma 1. As for the impossible meet-in-the-middle fault analysis on LED,
the probability of that a wrong key guess survives a test is 0.774.
Proof. In the proof, we ignore the final linear transformations. There are rela-
tions between βr and z as Fig. 3 shows:
z = βr ⊕ k1 ⊕ g,
zˆ = βˆr ⊕ k1 ⊕ g.
^
rβ
^
1rβ −
rβ
1rβ−
z
^
z
ω
^
ω1rδ −
^
1rδ −
µ
^
µ
Fig. 3. The relationships among variables.
Assume that βr−1⊕ β¯r−1 takes all 154 values without zeros equally likely. We
compute the probability that a wrong key guess survives a test. The computation
is based on the probability of truncated differentials. For the SubCells, the trun-
cated output difference equals the truncated input difference with probability 1.
Hence,
βr ∗ βˆr = δr−1 ∗ δˆr−1
and
z ∗ zˆ = µ ∗ µˆ,
10
where ∗ represents the truncated difference. Also, because addition with a subkey
does not change the difference, βr∗βˆr = z∗zˆ. Furthermore, there are probabilistic
relations between δr−1 ∗ δˆr−1 and βr−1 ∗ βˆr−1 and between µ ∗ µˆ and ω ∗ ωˆ
determined by the numbers in Table 4. Finally, we derive that the weight of
βr−1 ∗ βˆr−1 is always 4 and a wrong key is discarded if the weight of ω ∗ ωˆ is
smaller than 4.
Pr(wt(ω ∗ ωˆ) = 4)
=
4∑
d=1
(Pr(d = wt(δr−1 ∗ δˆr−1)) · Pr(wt(ω ∗ ωˆ) = 4|d = wt(z ∗ zˆ)))
=
4∑
d=1
(p1(d) · p2(d)).
Table 5 shows the values for p1(d) and p2(d). They are computed from the
entries in Table 3. Thus, we could compute the probability that a wrong key
guess survives a test is 0.774.
Table 5. The probability that a wrong key guess survives a test
d p1 p2 ·
0 0 0 0
1 60/50625 1 60/50625
2 990/50625 990/1350 98010/68343750
3 9540/50625 9540/13500 91011600/683437500
4 40035/50625 40035/50625 1602801225/2562890625∑ − − 0.774
5.3 Computing the number of faults
Lemma 2. For q ≥ 1 ,
σq = 2
16 − 216(1− 2−2.13)q,
where q represents the number of faults on average, and σq denotes the amount
of the removed subkey candidates with q faults.
Proof. Since the attackers do brute force search on each column with the
complexity of 216, the attackers could remove
216 · (1− 0.774) ≈ 213.85
candidates for every column of a subkey by applying one pair of correct and
faulty ciphertexts, where the probability of a wrong key guess survives a test
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equals 0.774 in Lemma 1. When other faults are induced, the subkey space can
cover partial candidates of the original subkey space. The overlap part of two
groups of equations is computed as
(213.85)2
216
=
227.70
216
= 211.70.
Hence, σq+1 and σq have the recursive relationship as
σq+1 = 2
13.85 + σq(1− 2−2.15),
where q ≥ 1 and σ0 = 0. The attackers can solve the above recursive formula
and derive
σq = 2
16 − 216(1− 2−2.15)q.
Theorem. In an impossible meet-in-the-middle fault attack on LED, the attack-
ers can recover one subkey by injecting 43.44 faults into the r–4 round, where
r ∈ {32, 48}.
Proof. The subkey space decreases
σq = 2
16 − 216(1− 2−2.15)q
from the above Lemma 1 and 2, if the attackers uses q equations. The space of
the secret key candidates must be 1 and hold
σq = 2
16 − 1.
That is,
q =
−16log(2)
log(1− 2−2.15) ≈ 43.44.
Hence, breaking LED-64 and LED-128 require 43.44 and 86.88 faults on average,
respectively.
5.4 Computing the complexity
The attacker can do brute-force search for one fault injection with the time
complexity of
4 · 216 · 154 ≈ 233.63.
The time complexity to break LED is
154 + θ · 233.63,
where θ denotes the number of faults. The value of θ is 43.44 for LED-64 and
86.88 for LED-128, respectively. Hence, to break LED-64 in theory, the data and
time complexity are 43.44 chosen plaintext-ciphertext pairs on average, and
154 + 43.44 · 233.63 ≈ 239.07,
respectively. To break LED-128 in theory, the data and time complexity are
86.88 chosen plaintext-ciphertext pairs, and
154 + 86.88 · 233.63 ≈ 240.07,
respectively.
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6 Simulation
The attacking environment includes three servers with 32-core processors and
64GB memory using Java. The fault injection are simulated with 1000 process
units by computer software. Accuracy, reliability and latency are taken into con-
sideration to evaluate the experimental results. Fig. 4 illustrates the intersections
of the subkey candidates, where the x-coordinate and the y-coordinate denote
the number of evaluated experiments and the logarithm of the subkey candidates
with base 2, respectively. The colored lines reflects the trend of the 1st, 11th,
22nd, 33rd, 44th, and 55th intersections, respectively.
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Fig. 4. The intersections of the subkey candidates in 1000 experiments.
Accuracy illustrates how close the subkey candidates are to the true subkey.
If the number of subkey candidates is close to one, the simulation is regarded to
be more accurate. The Root Mean-Square Error(RMSE) is defined as
RMSE =
√√√√ 1
n
n∑
e=1
(he − 1),
where n denotes the number of experiments in a subset, e represents the index of
each experiment, he denotes the number of subkey candidates. The RMSE trend
for every intersection of subkey candidates are shown in Table 6, where n = 200
and e ∈ {1, · · · , 1000}. And all experiments are categorized into five groups on
average, denoted as G1, G2, G3, G4 and G5. It illustrates that accuracy in each
group for the same interaction is appropriate.
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Table 6. The subkey recovery on Accuracy by RMSE
Groups 1 11 22 33 44 55
G1 197.33 61.09 16.59 4.47 1.19 0
G2 197.30 60.72 16.61 4.47 1.18 0
G3 197.28 60.97 16.63 4.46 1.18 0
G4 197.10 61.07 16.64 4.49 1.21 0
G5 197.17 61.12 16.61 4.47 1.16 0
Reliability describes the success rate in all experiments. The attack is re-
garded as successful until the attackers can derive only one subkey. The success
rates on average are 0%, 0%, 0%, 0%, 23.2% and 100% in Table 7, respectively.
The attackers had to inject 44.20 random faults on average to derive one sub-
key. To break LED-64 and LED-128, the data complexities are 44.20 and 88.40
chosen plaintext-ciphertext pairs in average, and the time complexities are
Table 7. The subkey recovery on Reliability
Groups 1 11 22 33 44 55
G1 0% 0% 0% 0% 22.5% 100%
G2 0% 0% 0% 0% 25.0% 100%
G3 0% 0% 0% 0% 24.5% 100%
G4 0% 0% 0% 0% 22.0% 100%
G5 0% 0% 0% 0% 22.0% 100%
154 + 44.20 · 233.63 ≈ 239.10,
and
154 + 88.40 · 233.63 ≈ 240.10,
respectively.
Latency is the time of recovering of one subkey. The latency of 100% exper-
iments is between 5s and 15s in Fig. 5.
7 Conclusions
This paper proposes a novel impossible meet-in-the-middle fault attack on LED
in a nibble-oriented fault model. The IMFA attack could break LED-64 and
LED-128 with only 44.20 and 88.40 faults on average, respectively. The attackers
can provoke faults into the deeper rounds of LED by X-Ray, radiation, Micro-
Probe in the hardware implementation, or alter the internal state of the code in
the software implementation of devices in vehicles. Hence, the first and last five
rounds of LED are suggested to be protected from fault analysis in VANETs.
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Fig. 5. The subkey recovery on Latency.
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